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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, 
v. 
COREY LYNN BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 920853-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions 
are copied in Appendix 1 to this brief: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII section 1 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-202 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-8 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-15 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 25 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 
Utah Rule of Evidence 606. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The time for the trial court to resolve juror 
Barber's incompetence was during the voir dire and the place for 
the trial court to resolve Mr. Barber's incompetence was on the 
record. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18; Constitution of 
Utah, Article VIII section 1. Well established law regarding the 
need for fair jury trials counsels against condoning the post-
oath, off-the-record discussion of a juror's qualifications 
between the juror and the judge. 
The trial court failed in his duty under Utah law to 
conduct an adequate voir dire to rebut the inference of bias 
attaching to the similar-crime-victim prospective jurors. Trial 
counsel did not request an adequate voir dire, but allowed two 
similar-crime-victim jurors to be seated on Mr. Brooks' jury, and 
used one of Mr. Brooks' peremptory challenges to remove a 
similar-crime-victim juror. This Court should reverse Mr. 
Brooks' convictions and order a new trial wherein the rudimentary 
law governing jury selection is applied. 
Because the jury did not have to find that Mr. 
Brooks committed any voluntary bodily movement in convicting him 
of aggravated burglary that was not encompassed in the elements 
of aggravated robbery, Mr. Brooks' conviction for aggravated 
burglary should be stricken. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE JURY SELECTION ERRORS 
REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL. 
A. THE BARBER AFFIDAVIT DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
In response to Mr. Brooks' argument that he was 
denied his rights to a fair trial because juror Barber was 
incompetent to serve on his jury, the State's brief includes and 
relies on an ex parte affidavit which is not part of the record 
on appeal. The State has also filed a separate contingent motion 
2 
to include the affidavit in the record. Brief of appellee at 7, 
16, Appendix III. This Court should reject the affidavit and 
strike the State's brief, admonishing the State that it is not 
above the law that matters included in appellate briefs which are 
not part of the record presented in the trial court will not be 
considered by the appellate courts. E.g. Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 11 and 25; Watkins v. Simonds,3 85 P.2d 154 (Utah 1963). 
Insofar as the affidavit seeks to shore up the 
verdict by addressing the internal deliberative process, the 
affidavit is inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 606. See 
State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988). Cf. e.g. Tanner v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987). 
Rather than obviating error, the ex parte affidavit 
calls into question the fundamental fairness of Mr. Brooks' jury 
trial. Mr. Brooks was supposed to have been tried in a court of 
record. Constitution of Utah, Article VIII section 1. The fact 
that the trial court apparently approached one of the jurors off 
the record is sufficient basis for the reversal of Mr. Brooks' 
conviction. See Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App. 
1989)(failure to record proceedings justifies reversal). 
In addition to demonstrating a violation of Mr. 
Brooks' right to be tried in a court of record, the affidavit 
raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to Mr. Brooks 
stemming from the trial court's discussion of personal matters 
bearing on the case with the juror. See State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 
277 (Utah 1985)(citing Constitution of Utah, Article I section 
3 
10, United States Constitution, Amendments VI and XIV; holding 
that a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from anything 
more than incidental contact between jurors and court personnel); 
Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224 (Utah App. 1990)(explaining 
bases for the presumption: taint from contact is difficult to 
prove, contact gives rise to appearance of impropriety). 
The affidavit is insufficient to rebut the prejudice 
it raises. Nowhere in the affidavit is there any indication that 
Mr. Barber was not influenced by the off-the-record encounter 
with the judge. Nor could Mr. Barber's opinion as to the impact 
of the encounter rebut the presumption of prejudice. See State 
v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987)("the denial by the juror 
that he had been influenced by the encounter was not enough to 
overcome the presumption of prejudice.11) . 
Even if the affidavit were properly in the record, 
it would not obviate the errors encompassed in seating Mr. Barber 
on Mr. Brooks' jury. The affidavit merely opines that Mr. Barber 
was not distracted from his service after he had made 
arrangements for his wife after the trial had begun, and does 
nothing to establish that Mr. Barber's service prior to the 
arrangements was adequate. The affidavit opines that Mr. Barber 
was not distracted by his need to take his wife to therapy 
because he had postponed her treatments. This does not resolve 
the bias reflected in his voir dire with the judge, wherein the 
judge asked him if the treatment schedule could be changed to fit 
the recesses in the trial, and wherein Mr. Barber maintained, "I 
4 
am not sure that I could devote my undivided attention to the 
case under the circumstances." (T2 29-31). Mr. Barber's 
assessment of the competency of his service is insufficient; 
jurors are not qualified to assess their own competency. State 
v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1992)("This court has 
consistently held that the trial court, not the juror, must 
determine a juror's qualifications."). 
Mr. Brooks agrees with the State that juror bias and 
juror incompetence are separate issues. Compare brief of 
appellant at 7 ("juror competency is separate issue from juror 
impartiality.") with brief of appellee at 14 ("Competence does 
not, as defendant seems to argue, deal with juror 'bias.'"). 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) allows for challenges 
for cause in the event of juror bias or incompetence, and applies 
in this case wherein Mr. Barber's distraction relating to his 
wife's injury, or "mental disability" resulted in his inability 
to act "without prejudice to the substantial rights" of Mr. 
Brooks to a competent jury. 
The State seeks to minimize Mr. Barber's 
incompetence, stating, "Barber only stated that he had a schedule 
conflict, posed by his wife's physical therapy appointments, that 
might cause him to be less than fully attentive at trial (R. 
270)." Brief of appellee at 14. The record demonstrates that 
Mr. Barber's concerns were more than a mere scheduling conflict. 
It was in response to the court's question about the ability to 
provide satisfactory jury service that Mr. Barber indicated under 
5 
oath that his wife had had knee surgery and that he had to take 
her to therapy. When the court asked if other arrangements could 
be made, Mr. Barber maintained that he had been unable to arrange 
to have someone else take her to therapy. When the court asked 
Mr. Barber if he was trying to make other arrangements, Mr. 
Barber did not relent, but indicated, "Well, she has until --a 
week from today she goes in to the doctor to see if the therapy 
is successful." The court asked again if other arrangements 
could be made, and Mr. Barber told the court, "I don't have 
anyone I could trust with her." The court asked if Mr. Barber 
had tried to reschedule the therapy and Mr. Barber said that he 
had not. The court informed Mr. Barber about the court's normal 
recess schedule, and asked if Mr. Barber could work with that 
schedule. Mr. Barber stated, "I am not sure that I could devote 
my undivided attention to the case under the circumstances." 
(T2. 29-31). 
The State argues that because Mr. Barber's 
disability did not indicate a bias to either side, the court 
"could not possibly predict which party would be prejudiced by 
the distraction" and that the trial court could fairly assume 
that the prejudice stemming from the disability would be borne 
equally between the parties, and allow Mr. Barber to serve on the 
jury. Brief of appellee at 15. The fact that a juror's lack of 
qualification may harm both parties does not absolve the trial 
court of his responsibility to see that the jury seated comports 
with statutory and constitutional requirements. Mr. Barber's 
6 
service prejudiced Mr. Brooks' substantial constitutional right 
to a competent jury. E.g. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 
126 (1987) . 
The State argues that Mr. Barber's incompetence 
falls under Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-15, which allows jurors 
to be excused on the grounds of hardship. The State argues that 
the hardship statute constitutes a statutory exemption from 
service, and argues that as an exemption, the hardship privilege 
must be raised by the prospective juror. Brief of appellee at 16 
(citing Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(h)). The hardship 
statute does not constitute a statutory exemption from jury 
service, but merely gives trial courts the discretion to excuse 
jurors. Because Mr. Brooks has a right to a mentally competent 
jury, which was compromised by Mr. Barber's service, Mr. Brooks 
has standing to raise the issue. 
The Barber affidavit, recording the trial court's 
off-the-record efforts to correct the errors of seating Mr. 
Barber, demonstrates that it should have been plain to the trial 
court during the voir dire that Mr. Barber was not competent to 
serve, and that trial counsel was objectively deficient in 
failing to challenge juror Barber. This Court should reverse Mr. 
Brooks' conviction and order a new trial. 
B. THE SERVICE OF JURORS PIKE AND HEAP REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL. 
Mr. Brooks is arguing that the trial court committed 
plain error, and that trial counsel was constitutionally 
deficient because jurors Pike and Heap were seated on the jury in 
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the absence of voir dire concerning their past victimization of 
the crimes at issue in this case. In response, the State posits 
that the trial court acted within his discretion in protecting 
juror privacy from probing on the topic. Brief of appellee at 
17-18. The State argues similarly that trial counsel should be 
presumed to have made a tactical choice to cater to the jurors' 
privacy in failing to demand voir dire on the jurors' 
victimization. Brief of appellee at 29-30. The State's 
arguments overlook the trial court's duty to see to it that the 
voir dire of prospective jurors is constitutionally adequate, 
e.g., State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992), and 
trial counsel's duties to investigate before making tactical 
choices, e.g. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691 
(1984). When a defendant's right to an impartial jury clashes 
with a prospective juror's right to privacy, the defendant's 
right must prevail, particularly in light of the availability of 
in camera voir dire. E.g. State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 
1984) . 
The State's argument that the trial court and trial 
counsel were properly protecting the privacy of jurors Pike and 
Heap in failing to probe their presumptive prejudice is 
nonsensical particularly on this record, wherein the trial court 
and trial counsel did investigate similar biases with other 
prospective jurors (T2 75-85). 
The State argues that the trial court acted within 
his discretion in inquiring into prior crimes experience only 
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with those jurors who had been victims of violent assaultive 
conduct, and that the court's failure to inquire into Mi I »j ke's 
leap's pi:ioi crimes experience is justified because they 
were merely burglarized but not directly assaulted. Brief of 
appellee at 19. Because the trial court i i ri nor ask jurors Pike 
and Heap about their prior victimizations, it cannot be said that 
they were not "direct" victims or victims of violence or assault. 
More importantly, the trial court' s cii lty t> : :t : ebi it tl le :I nference 
of bias attaching to similar-crime-victim jurors applies to all 
prospective jurors with similar crimes experience, not just to 
"direct" victims or violev : ne vict .. E.g. State v. Wooley, 
tilU P.2d 440 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 65 (Utah 1991). 
The State argues that the voir dire of jurors Pike 
and H^.-ir. wa s adeqi i-ate because neither jui co indicated a bias when 
the trial court asked the potential jurors if there was anything 
that might cause them to be biased. Brief of appellee at 19. 
The competent ;. :> assess their 
own biases, and that it is the duty of the trial court to 
sufficiently probe juror biases to rebut presumptive biases and 
to al3 > gent exercise of peremptory and for-cause 
challenges. See opening brief of appellant at 5-7, 13-16. 
The State argues that there should be no inference 
o £ b :I a s a 11 a c h i i lg t • :: p r o s p e c t: j v e j u r o i s wl ic 1 I a ' e s u ffered cri me s 
similar to those to be tried, noting that the Utah Legislature 
has stated its intention to allow all qualified citizens serve 
as ]umr \ Vhe tale argues that the inference of bias attaching 
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to similar-crime-victim jurors involves judicial circumvention of 
the intention of the legislature, and therefore violates the 
doctrine of separation of governmental powers. Brief of appellee 
at 20. The legislature has expressly and appropriately placed 
the burden on the courts to insure that constitutional rights to 
impartial juries are respected. E.g. Utah Code Ann. section 78-
46-8. The Utah Courts' well-established tradition of recognizing 
a rebuttable inference of bias attaching to similar-crime-victim 
jurors is consistent with this responsibility, and in no way 
infringes on prospective jurors7 right to participate in the jury 
system if they are qualified to do so. 
C. THE USE OF A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO REMOVE JUROR GEURTS, IN 
THE ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT VOIR DIRE, CALLS FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Mr. Brooks is arguing that prospective juror Geurts 
should have been removed for cause, or examined by the trial 
court until the inference of bias attaching to her, as a victim 
of crimes similar to those at issue here. He is also arguing 
that the use of his peremptory challenge to remove this juror was 
reversible error. Mr. Brooks is asserting the plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines in addressing this 
issue. In response, the State argues that no obvious error 
occurred because juror Geurts may have been biased against the 
prosecution because her husband was a defense witness in a 
separate trial tried by Mr. Brooks' prosecutor. The State also 
notes that juror Geurts shared the same religious affiliation 
with the prosecutor. Ms. Geurts' husband's prior participation 
in another case, and Ms. Geurts' religious affiliation have 
10 
nothing to do with the trial court's duties to investigate the 
inference of bias attaching to jurors ; 1 i : 1 is ! • B suffered 22 : :1 mes 
similar o those to be tried, or to remove the jurors. E.g. 
Woolev. 
D. REVERSAL IS APPROPRIATE. 
The State argues that this Court should condone the 
voir dire in this case because the trial court and trial counsel 
had an "advantaged view, '" a .1 1 :i :i :ii :i not seek additional voir ciii e 
or challenge the similar-crimes-victim jurors for cause. Brief 
of appellee at 22, citing State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah 
App. 1992). I 1 «n t- rami" t the Ellifritz record, the overall 
voir dire in this case demonstrates that the trial court and 
trial counsel failed to apply the law guaranteeing Mr. Brooks 
c o m p e t e n t IJT"MII« n - q u n 1111-1 t cidl I J I J U I U - l o i n s u r e t h e 
impartiality of jurors by conducting adequate jury selection 
proceedings, and requiring defense counsel to protect their 
client..s' Ljyhti MM / selection proceedings. •-*;.. .e the trial 
court and trial counsel did have direct access to the potential 
jurors, because of an apparent unawareness of the governing law, 
the . d : --A . *. not iise their opportunity 
to examine the jurors as the law required. Because the record 
demonstrates that the trial court and counsel failed in their 
1 ega] respons:i bi ] i ti e s cii ir 2 1 lg the voir d2 re, a new trial is 
appropriate. 
The State theorizes that the courts need not concern 
themselves with pi tint bias because Utah felony juries exceeds 
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federal standards in the number of jurors who participate in 
felony juries, and that the larger number of jurors improves the 
possibilities that some juror biases will be offset by other 
juror biases. The State then speculates that the biases of 
jurors Pike, Heap and Geurts were likely offset by pro-defense 
biases of the other five jurors. Brief of appellee at 23-24. 
There is no basis in the record for the State's theory, which is 
contradicted by the verdicts. The fact that the Utah 
Constitution calls for greater protection of jury rights than 
federal standards does not diminish the trial courts' duties to 
insure jury rights. The State's argument is inconsistent with 
Utah case law, which law is consistent with the greater 
protection afforded by the Utah Constitution, in exhorting trial 
courts to exceed federal minimum standards in conducting jury 
voir dire. E.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991). 
The State indicates its intention to ask the Utah 
Supreme Court to overrule the law that it is reversible error to 
force a defendant to utilize a peremptory challenge to remove a 
juror who should have been removed for cause. Brief of appellee 
at 25-26. Inasmuch as the State is not asking this Court to 
address the matter, suffice it to say that peremptory challenges 
are substantial rights necessary to a defendant's obtaining a 
fair trial, and that the compromise of such a right properly 
calls for reversal. See e.g. State v. Young, 2 08 Utah Adv. Rep. 
6, 11 (Utah 1993). 
In addressing the ineffective assistance of counsel 
12 
argument, the State argues that trial counsel participated 
adequately. Brief of appellee at 28. The service of jurors 
Barber, Pike and Heap, and the peremptory challenge of Geurts, in 
the absence of even a request for adequate voir dire, contradicts 
the State's argument. The State argues that trial c o u n s e ] s 
failure to request voir dire of the jurors should be condoned as 
valid tactical performance because probing the jurors may have 
angered them and preji id i ced then i against I li : Bi ooks Br d ef of 
appellee at 29-30. The record contradicts the State's 
speculation, because trial counsel did probe some of the jurors; 
there is nothiii - record indicating that counsel was acting 
under any apprehension of offending the jurors with voir dire 
questions. Had there been a danger of angering the jurors, trial 
counsel <.. . •. .• request .reside the pai lelists' presence 
for the court to conduct additional voir dire. An attorney 
cannot make a valid tactical choice to allow biases recognized by 
] a i/vi to go in lii ivestigated, ,.,. : - .mow incompetent and 
presumptively biased jurors to participate on his client's case. 
See brief of appellant at 19-21. 
The State argues that no plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel occurred in the in the jury selection 
process because Mr. Brooks has shown no likelihood of a more 
favorable result. Brief of appellee at 22. Mr. Brooks is unable 
to make an evidentiary assessment of prejudice stemming from the 
jury selection errors because it cannot be known hew 
participation of different jurors would have influenced the 
13 
deliberations. When there are fundamental structural errors such 
as this, prejudice should be presumed. See brief of appellant at 
20-23. Cf. Vasauez v. Hillerv, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986)(Court 
could not rely on defendant's conviction to apply harmless error 
analysis to racial discrimination in the selection of the grand 
jury, because Court could not determine whether the defendant 
would have been indicted at all in the absence of the error in 
the grand jury proceedings). 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE THE AGGRAVATED BURGLARY CONVICTION. 
Mr. Brooks is arguing that the aggravated burglary 
conviction should be stricken because it did not involve a 
separate act from the acts essential to the aggravated robbery 
conviction, as the term act is defined by Utah Code Ann. section 
76-1-601(1) (a voluntary bodily movement). Brief of appellant at 
23-27. In response, the State argues, "The Utah Supreme Court 
has squarely rejected defendant's argument that 'remaining' is 
not an 'act' for the purposes of the burglary statute. See State 
v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 974, 876 (Utah 1985, amended on rehearing 
1988)." Brief of appellee at 34. A copy of the Bradley decision 
is in appendix 2 to this brief. Nowhere in the Bradley decision 
does the Utah Supreme Court address the question. 
In order to convict one of aggravated burglary, the 
State must prove that one entered or remained unlawfully in a 
building with the intent to commit a felony with a firearm. Utah 
Code Ann. sections 76-6-202 and 203. It was the State's theory 
14 
in this case that Mr. Brooks remained unlawfully in the Vert 
residence; there was no evidence that Mr. Brooks entered the Vert 
residence unlawfully --he did so with the consent of Stephanie 
Vert. Because remaining is not a voluntary bodily movement, it 
is not an act under the Utah Code jtistifyin . separate 
conviction bearing a five to life prison sentence. Because on 
the facts of this case, the jurors were not required to find that 
Mr. Brooks committed any i I ( tl. aggravated burglary 
conviction that was not already committed for the aggravated 
robbery conviction, this Court should reverse the aggravated 
robbery corn/id ion . See Bradley. 
CONCLUSION 
This Coui : t: should reverse M i 
and order a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 
• -•K_i' convictions 
day of May, 1993. 
r. Brooks 
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APPENDI 
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
, u I ii," 11" I, Section t\ il the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a 
jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of 
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of 
the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil 
cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Article VIII, Section 1 of tlle Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 1. [Judicial powers—Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be 
vested in a supreme court, in a trial court of 
general jurisdiction known as the district court, 
and in such other courts as the Legislature by 
statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the 
district court, and such other courts designated 
by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not 
of record shall also be established by statute. 
Amendment VI In "\ h^ Constitution ~^ *mX*~ "nited States provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
Amendment ;ne Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge th<* 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and 
Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of 
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, 
or in any way abridged, except for participation 
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or 
Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or 
under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer 
of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution 
of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same or 
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each 
House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the 
United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation 
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601 provides: 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following 
terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement 
and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal 
responsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury, or a facsimile or representation of the 
item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent 
intended use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is 
in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any 
penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when 
there is a legal duty to act and the actor is 
capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or 
private corporation, government, partnership, or 
unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical 
possession of or to exercise dominion or control 
over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily 
injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
Utah Code Ann, section 76-6-202 provides: 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) a person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or theft or commit an assault on any 
person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third 
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203 provides: 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing 
from a burglary the actor or another participant 
in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person 
who is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use 
of a dangerous weapon against any person who 
is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any 
explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree 
felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous 
weapon" has the same definition as under Section 
76-1-601. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 provides: 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery* 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree 
felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt 
to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-8 provides: 
78-46-8. Determination on juror qualification— 
Persons not competent to serve as jurors. 
(1) The court, on its own initiative or 
when requested by a prospective juror, shall 
determine whether the prospective juror is 
disqualified from jury service. The court shall 
base its decision on the information provided on 
the juror qualification form, or by interview 
with the prospective juror or other competent 
evidence. The clerk shall enter the court's 
determination on the juror qualification form and 
on the alphabetical list of names drawn from the 
master jury wheel. 
(2) The following persons are not competent 
to serve as jurors: 
(a) a person who has been convicted of 
a felony; 
(b) a person serving on active duty in 
the military service of the United States; 
(c) a person who is not capable because 
of physical or mental disability of 
rendering satisfactory jury service. Any 
person who claims this disqualification may 
be required to submit a physician's 
certificate verifying the disability and the 
certifying physician is subject to inquiry 
by the court at its discretion; or 
(d) a person who does not meet the 
requirements of Section 78-46-7. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-15 provides: 
78-46-15. Excuse from jury service. 
(1) The court, upon request of a 
prospective juror or on its own initiative, shall 
determine on the basis of information provided on 
the juror qualification form or by interview with 
the prospective juror, or by other competent 
evidence, whether the prospective juror should be 
excused from jury service. The clerk shall enter 
this determination in the space provided on the 
juror qualification form. 
(2) A person may be excused from jury 
service by the court, at its discretion, upon a 
showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, 
or public necessity for any period the court 
deems necessary. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. 
The original papers and exhibits filed in the 
trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if 
any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial 
court, and where available the docket sheet, 
shall constitute the record on appeal in all 
cases. A copy of the record certified by the 
clerk of the trial court to conform to the 
original may be substituted for the original as 
the record on appeal. Only those papers 
prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall 
be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, 
the clerk of the trial court shall paginate all 
of the original papers and any transcript filed 
in that court in chronological order and shall 
prepare a chronological index of those papers. 
The index shall contain a reference to the date 
on which the paper was filed in the trial court 
and the starting page of the record on which the 
paper will be found. Clerks of the trial and 
appellate courts shall establish rules and 
procedures for checking out the record after 
pagination for use by the parties in preparing 
briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing 
a petition for writ of certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the 
notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event 
that more than one appeal is taken, each 
appellant, shall comply with the provisions of 
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall 
take any other action necessary to enable the 
clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit 
the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers 
in a criminal case shall be included by the 
clerk of the trial court as part of the 
record on appeal. 
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, 
the papers to be transmitted shall consist 
of the following. 
(A) Civil cases with short 
records. In civil cases where all the 
papers total fewer than 300 pages, all 
of the papers will be transmitted to 
the appellate court upon completion of 
the filing of briefs. In such cases, 
the appellant shall serve upon the 
clerk of the trial court, 
simultaneously with the filing of 
appellant's reply brief, notice of the 
date on which appellant's reply brief 
was filed. If appellant does not 
intend to file a reply brief, appellant 
shall notify the clerk of the trial 
court of that fact within 30 days of 
the filing of appellee's brief. 
(B) All other civil cases. In 
all other civil cases where the papers 
are or exceed 300 pages, all parties 
shall file with the clerk of the trial 
court, within 10 days after briefing is 
completed, a joint or separate 
designation of those papers referred to 
in their respective briefs. Only those 
designated papers and the following, to 
the extent applicable, shall be 
transmitted to the clerk of the 
appellate court by the clerk of the 
trial court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined 
in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order if 
any; 
(iii) the final judgment, 
order, or interlocutory order from 
which the appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to 
be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, 
findings of fact or conclusions of 
law filed or delivered by the 
trial court; 
(vi) the motion, response, 
and accompanying memoranda upon 
which the court rendered judgment, 
if any; 
(vii) jury instructions 
given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and 
interrogatories, if any; 
(ix) the notice of appeal. 
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in 
the agency record total fewer than 300 
pages, the agency shall transmit all papers 
to the appellate court. Where all papers in 
the agency record total 300 or more pages, 
the parties shall, within 10 days after 
briefing is completed, file with the agency 
a joint or separate designation of those 
papers necessary to the appeal. The agency 
shall transmit those designated papers to 
the appellate court. Instead of filing all 
papers or designated papers, the agency may, 
with the approval of the court, file only 
the chronological index of the record or of 
such parts of the record as the parties may 
designate. All parts of the record retained 
by the agency shall be considered part of 
the record on review for all purposes, 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of 
appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial 
transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for 
filing. Within 10 days after filing the 
notice of appeal, the appellant shall 
request from the reporter a transcript of 
such parts of the proceedings not already on 
file as the appellant deems necessary. The 
request shall be in writing, and, within the 
same period, a copy shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court and the clerk of 
the appellate court. If no such parts of 
the proceedings are to be requested, within 
the same period the appellant shall file a 
certificate to that effect with the clerk of 
the trial court and a copy with the clerk of 
the appellate court. If there are no 
reporter but the proceedings were otherwise 
recorded, the appellant shall request from a 
court transcriber certified in accordance 
with the rules and procedures of the 
Judicial Council a transcript of such parts 
of the proceeding not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary. By stipulation 
of the parties approved by the appellate 
court, a person other than a certified court 
transcriber may transcribe a recorded 
hearing. The clerk of the appellate court 
shall, upon request, provide a list of all 
certified court transcribers. The 
transcriber is subject to all of the 
obligations imposed on reporters by these 
rules. 
(2) Transcript required of all 
evidence regarding challenged finding or 
conclusion. If the appellant intends to 
urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion 
is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion. 
(3) Statement of issues; cross-
designation by appellee. Unless the entire 
transcript is to be included, the appellant 
shall, within 10 days after filing the 
notice of appeal, file a statement of the 
issues that will be presented on appeal and 
shall serve on the appellee a copy of the 
request or certificate and a copy of the 
statement. If the appellee deems a 
transcript of other parts of the proceedings 
to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 
10 days after the service of the request or 
certificate and the statement of the 
appellant, file and serve on the appellant a 
designation of additional parts to be 
included. Unless within 10 days after 
service of such designation the appellant 
has requested such parts and has so notified 
the appellee, the appellee may within the 
following 10 days either request the parts 
or move in the trial court for an order 
requiring the appellant to do so. 
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time 
of the request, a party shall make 
satisfactory arrangements with the reporter 
or transcriber for payment of the cost of 
the transcript. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on 
appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as 
defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the 
parties may prepare and sign a statement of the 
case, showing how the issues presented by the 
appeal arose and were decided in the trial court 
and setting forth only so many of the facts 
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are 
essential to a decision of the issues presented. 
If the statement conforms to the truth, it, 
together with such additions as the trial court 
may consider necessary fully to present the 
issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by 
the trial court. The clerk of the trial court 
shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the 
appellate court within the time prescribed by 
Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court 
shall transmit the index of the record to the 
clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the 
statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings 
when no report was made or when transcript is 
unavailable. If no report of the evidence or 
proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if 
a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may 
prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means, 
including recollection. The statement shall be 
served on the appellee, who may serve objections 
or propose amendments within 10 days after 
service. The statement and any objections or 
proposed amendments shall be submitted to the 
trial court for settlement and approval and, as 
settled and approved, shall be included by the 
clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the 
record. If any difference arises as to whether 
the record truly discloses what occurred in the 
trial court, the difference shall be submitted to 
and settled by that court and the record made to 
conform to the truth. If anything material to 
either party is omitted from the record by error 
or accident or is misstated, the parties by 
stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate 
court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted, may direct that the omission or 
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a 
supplemental record be certified and 
transmitted. The moving party, or the court if 
it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve 
on the parties a statement of the proposed 
changes. Within 10 days after service, any party 
may serve objections to the proposed changes. 
All other questions as to the form and content of 
the record shall be presented to the appellate 
court. (Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 25, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian 
ad litem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian 
ad litem representing a minor who is not a party 
to the appeal may be filed only if accompanied by 
written consent of all parties, or by leave of 
court granted on motion or at the request of the 
court. A motion for leave shall identify the 
interest of the applicant and shall state the 
reasons why a brief of an amicus curiae or the 
guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as all 
parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or 
guardian ad litem shall file its brief within the 
time allowed the party whose position as to 
affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae or 
guardian ad litem will support, unless the court 
for cause shown otherwise orders. A motion of an 
amicus curiae or guardian ad litem to participate 
in the oral argument will be granted when 
circumstances warrant in the court's discretion. 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call 
the number of the jurors that are to try the 
cause plus such an additional number as will 
allow for all peremptory challenges permitted. 
After each challenge for cause sustained, another 
juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before 
further challenges are made, and any such new 
juror may be challenged for cause. When the 
challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and 
each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall 
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one 
juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may 
direct, until all peremptory challenges are 
exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call 
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall 
be necessary to constitute the jury, in the order 
in which they appear on the list, and the persons 
whose names are so called shall constitute the 
jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to conduct the examination of the 
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination. In the latter event, the court may 
permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems 
proper, or may itself submit to the prospective 
jurors additional questions requested by counsel 
or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or 
to an individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors 
called to serve at a particular court or for 
the trial of a particular action. A 
challenge to the panel is an objection made 
to all jurors summoned and may be taken by 
either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can 
be founded only on a material departure 
from the procedure prescribed with 
respect to the selection, drawing, 
summoning and return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel 
shall be taken before the jury is sworn 
and shall be in writing or recorded by 
the reporter. It shall specifically 
set forth the facts constituting the 
grounds of the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel 
is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question 
of fact upon which the challenge is 
based. The jurors challenged, and any 
other persons, may be called as 
witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the 
challenge. If the challenge to the 
panel is allowed, the court shall 
discharge the jury so far as the trial 
in question is concerned. If a 
challenge is denied, the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to 
proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror 
may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made 
only before the jury is sworn to try the 
action, except the court may, for good 
cause, permit it to be made after the juror 
is sworn but before any of the evidence is 
presented. In challenges for cause the 
rules relating to challenges to a panel and 
hearings thereon shall apply. All 
challenges for cause shall be taken first by 
the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection 
to a juror for which no reason need be given. In 
capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 
peremptory challenges. In other felony cases 
each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is 
entitled to three peremptory challenges. If 
there is more than one defendant the court may 
allow the defendants additional peremptory 
challenges and permit them to be exercised 
separately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection 
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or 
more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications 
prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity 
which renders one incapable of performing 
the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within 
the fourth degree to the person alleged to 
be injured by the offense charged, or on 
whose complaint the prosecution was 
instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, 
witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, 
which relationship when viewed objectively, 
would suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be 
free of favoritism. A prospective juror 
shall not be disqualified solely because he 
is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party 
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, 
or having complained against or having been 
accused by him in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury 
which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which 
has tried another person for the particular 
offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally 
sworn to try the same charge, and whose 
verdict was set aside, or which was 
discharged without a verdict after the case 
was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil 
action brought against the defendant for the 
act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is 
punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death 
penalty as would preclude the juror from 
voting to impose the death penalty following 
conviction regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year 
preceding, has been engaged or interested in 
carrying on any business, calling or 
employment, the carrying on of which is a 
violation of law, where defendant is charged 
with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, 
whether for or against the defendant on the 
preliminary examination or before the grand 
jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will 
prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights 
of the party challenging; but no person 
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason 
of having formed or expressed an opinion 
upon the matter or cause to be submitted to 
such jury, founded upon public rumor, 
statements in public journals or common 
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to 
the court that the juror can and will, 
notwithstanding such opinion, act 
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be 
submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken 
first by the prosecution and then by the defense 
alternately. Challenges for cause shall be 
completed before peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate 
jurors be impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the 
order in which they are called, shall replace 
jurors who are, or become, unable or disqualified 
to perform their duties. The prosecution and 
defense shall each have one additional peremptory 
challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same 
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the 
same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a 
juror is a privilege of the person exempted and 
is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall 
be administered to the jurors, in substance, that 
they and each of them will well and truly try the 
matter in issue between the parties, and render a 
true verdict according to the evidence and the 
instructions of the court. 
Rule 606, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 606. Competency of juror as witness. 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may 
not testify as a witness before that jury in the 
trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. 
If the juror is called so to testify, the 
opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity 
to object out of the presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or 
indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of 
a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify 
as to any matter or statement occurring during 
the course of the jury's deliberations or to the 
effect of anything upon that or any other juror's 
mind or emotions as influencing the juror to 
assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning the juror's mental 
processes in connection therewith, except that a 
juror may testify on the question whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention or whether any 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or 
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning 
a matter about which the juror would be precluded 
from testifying be received for these purposes. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
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Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. 
Wilkinson, J., of aggravated assault, ag-
gravated burglary, and tampering with a 
witness, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court held that (1) conviction of tamper-
ing with witness would be sustained on 
evidence indicating that defendant wanted 
to stop victim from involving herself with 
any official proceeding or litigation defend-
ant believed was underway, and on rehear-
ing, held that (2) aggravated assault was 
lesser included offense of aggravated bur-
glary, on instructions given and evidence 
presented, and assault conviction would 
thus be reversed. 
Reversed in part and otherwise af-
firmed. 
1. Assault and Battery <s=>54t 71 
Offense of aggravated assault amount-
ed to an attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another, or a 
threat of bodily injury to another accompa-
nied by a show of immediate force or vio-
lence and was established as against de-
fendant notwithstanding that it was de-
fendant's companion and not defendant 
who held weapon to victim during incident 
giving rise to offense. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-
202, 76-S-102. 
2. Burglary e=»15 
Consent manifested by victim when he 
opened door to defendant, who he believed 
had come to his house for lawful purpose, 
was limited to that purpose and did not, in 
context of charge of aggravated burglary 
authorize defendant to order victim out of 
house at gunpoint U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202. 
3. Burglary <s=>15 
A consent to enter limited as to place, 
time, or purpose is not a defense to burgla-
ry where entry occurs outside limitation* 
stated or implied. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202. 
4. Burglary <s=»41(4) 
Element of unlawful entry was estab-
lished with respect to crime of aggravated 
burglary on evidence indicating that de-
fendant entered or remained unlawfully in 
victim's home with intent to commit an 
assault U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202. 
5. Obstructing Justice <s=>4 
Crime of tampering with a witness re-
quires no more than that a defendant be-
lieve an official proceeding or investigation 
to be underway. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-508. 
6. Obstructing Justice G=*16 
Conviction of tampering with witness 
was sustained on evidence indicating that 
defendant wanted to stop victim from in-
volving herself with any official proceeding 
or litigation he believed was underway. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-8-508. 
7. Criminal Law <£»29 
When a defendant has improperly been 
convicted of both the greater and the in-
cluded offense, the conviction on the includ-
ed offense is treated as mere surplusage, 
and the conviction of the greater offense 
remains unaffected. 
On Petition For Rehearing 
8. Indictment and Information e=>191(2) 
As theoretical proposition, defendant 
could commit aggravated burglary without 
committing aggravated assault, as aggra-
vated burglary may require no more than 
that burglar be armed with deadly weapon 
and being armed with deadly weapon 
would not, in and of itself, amount to as-
sault, but when element that burglar uses 
or threatens immediate use of dangerous 
or deadly weapon against any person who 
is not participant in crime is relied upon by 
prosecution to prove aggravated burglary, 
aggravated assault is simultaneously prov-
STATE v. 
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en, for purposes of determining whether 
aggravated assault is lesser included of-
fense of aggravated burglary. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-5-103(lXb), 76-6-203(b, c). 
9. Indictment and Information e=>191(2) 
Aggravated assault was lesser includ-
ed offense of aggravated burglary in pros-
ecution in which defendant was convicted 
of both offenses, and reversal of assault 
conviction was accordingly required; in-
structions on aggravated burglary included 
element that defendant used or threatened 
immediate use of dangerous or deadly 
weapon against any person, and comparing 
instructions on aggravated burglary and 
aggravated assault, jury did not have to 
find any additional elements for conviction 
of aggravated assault beyond elements of 
crime of aggravated burglary, evidence 
was that defendant, with two companions, 
entered victim's home at victim's invitation, 
and that one of the companions pulled vic-
tim's shotgun from rack on the wall, drew 
pistol from his waist, and pointed it at 
victim's head. U.CA.1953, 76-5-103(l)(b), 
76-6~203(b). 
John C- Green, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent 
PER CURIAM. 
Defendant Kenneth Dee Bradley was 
convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 
§ 76-5-103 (1978 ed.), aggravated burgla-
ry, a first degree felony in violation of 
section 76-6-203, and tampering with a wit-
ness, a third degree felony in violation of 
section 76-8-508. He appeals from all 
three convictions claiming that the evidence 
adduced at trial failed as a matter of law to 
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that he cannot be convicted of 
both a lesser offense and a greater offense. 
We reverse in part and affirm in part 
During her separation from her husband 
Bill, Gina Rider dated Tom Bettwieser who 
bad been investigated for theft of funds 
belonging to a partnership in which defend-
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ant and Tom Adams were partners and 
Bettwieser was an employee. Defendant 
was also a suspect in the theft On the day 
of the theft, Bettwieser informed Gina that 
he had committed the theft In the course 
of the investigation of the partnership, 
Gina was contacted by law enforcement 
officials, was subpoenaed as a witness, and 
was involved with Tom Adams' private in-
vestigation of the theft 
On December 24, 1982, Bettwieser ar-
ranged for Gina and her two children to 
move into a house managed by defendant 
at 11th East and 17th South in Salt Lake 
City. Bill and Gina Rider reconciled, and 
with defendant's approval, Bill moved into 
the house a day later with the under-
standing that in lieu of rent, the Riders 
would pay the utilities for the house and an 
attached locksmith shop. On the day Rider 
moved in, he and Gina had an argument in 
which defendant intervened. Rider threat-
ened defendant and his stepson with a 
sawed-off shotgun, but later everybody 
apologized, and the Riders continued to oc-
cupy the home. 
In the afternoon of January 27, 1983, 
defendant, "Spider" Wissink, and "Bett" 
Bettwieser, Tom Bettwieser's younger 
brother, drove to the Riders' home. The 
Riders, their two small children, and Gina's 
eighteen-year-old sister were at home. 
Rider was expecting defendant because he 
needed his signature on some social securi-
ty papers. He opened the door for defend-
ant, telling Gina that defendant was there. 
The three men entered, and Spider pulled 
Rider's shotgun from a rack on the wall, 
drew a pistol from his waist, and pointed it 
at Rider's head. He turned to defendant 
and asked, "What do you want me to do, 
boss? Do you want me to break some 
bones or blow them away?" Defendant 
answered that he thought the matter could 
be settled without violence. He then in-
formed Gina that he was tired of her in-
volvement with Tom Adams, that she had 
been talking too much and he wanted it 
stopped, and that he would "just as soon 
blow you away as look at you if it gets to 
i t " The Riders' four-year-old girl became 
frightened and started screaming. Spider 
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told her that he did not want to hurt her 
daddy and that he was just doing his job. 
Defendant, at that point, ordered the Rid-
ers out of the house. Spider took Rider at 
gunpoint through the rooms to gather his 
belongings. When the Riders refused to 
use defendant's truck to move, he left and 
said he would be back at the end of the 
day. Rider called the police, who escorted 
the family out of the home. 
At the end of the state's case in chief, 
defendant moved to dismiss the charges 
against him for the State's failure to meet 
its burden of proof. That motion was de-
nied In this appeal, defendant challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
verdict of guilty on all three charges. We 
view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the jury verdict and do not disturb the 
jury verdict unless the evidence is so lack-
ing and insubstantial that a reasonable 
man could not possibly have reached a ver-
dict beyond a reasonable doubt State v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). We 
apply that same standard to those facts 
that can be reasonably inferred from the 
evidence presented at trial. State v. Grif-
fin, 685 P.2d 546 (Utah 1984). 
I. 
[1] In support of his claim that the evi-
dence adduced at trial failed as a matter of 
law to establish his guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt on the charge of aggravated 
assault, defendant contends that the stat-
ute interdicts the use of "a deadly weapon 
or such means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily harm." Defendant 
takes the position that it was Spider and 
not he who held the weapon and that the 
State entirely failed to prove assault 
against him. The trial court properly in-
structed the jury on aggravated assault 
and on assault as an attempt, with unlaw-
ful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another, or a threat of bodily injury to 
another accompanied by a show of immedi-
ate force or violence. U.C.A. §§ 76-5-102 
and 103 (1978 e&). It also instructed the 
jury that defendant could be held criminal-
ly liable for the conduct of another, as 
defined in section 76-2-202. See also 
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983). 
The evidence delineated above was suffi-
ciently substantial for the jury to find de-
fendant guilty of aggravated assault 
[2-4] Defendant's challenge to the suf-
ficiency of the evidence on the conviction of 
aggravated burglary is grounded inter 
alia in his claim that he did not enter the 
Rider premises unlawfully, and thus a cru-
cial element of the crime of burglary was 
not established. Defendant overlooks the 
fact that a person is guilty of burglary "if 
he enters or remains unlawfully in a build-
ing . . . with intent to commit . . . an as-
sault on any person." U.C.A. § 76-6-202 
(1978) (emphasis added). In State v. 
Brown, 6 Kan.App.2d 556, 630 P.2d 731 
(1981), the court, in defining a statute sim-
ilar to Utah's, K.S.A. 21-3716, stated that 
"remaining within refers to the situation 
where defendant's initial entry is autho-
rized, but at some later time that person's 
presence becomes unauthorized." Id 630 
P.2d at 735. Although it is true that Rider 
opened the door to defendant whom he 
expected to come to his house for a lawful 
purpose, his consent to defendant's entry 
was limited to that purpose and did not 
authorize defendant to order Rider out of 
the house at gunpoint "[A] consent limit-
ed as to place, time, or purpose is not a 
defense where entry occurs outside the 
limitation stated or implied." State v. 
Keys, 244 Or. 606, 419 P.2d 943, 946 (1966) 
(citations omitted). See also State v. 
Pierce, 14 Utah 2d 177, 380 P.2d 725 (1963) 
(no consent where entry obtained through 
deception). The jury was well within its 
province in finding that defendant entered 
or remained unlawfully in the Rider home 
with the intent to commit an assault De-
fendant's remaining point, that the jury 
was not instructed that defendant was an 
accomplice, is contradicted by the record as 
stated above. 
[5,6] Defendant next contends that the 
state failed to put on any credible evidence 
of a pending official proceeding or investi-
gation to convict him of tampering with a 
witness. That argument is based on a 
faulty premise. The statute requires no 
more than that a defendant believe an offi-
STATE v. 
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cial proceeding or investigation to be un-
derway. The jury was properly instructed 
on the elements set out in section 76-S-508. 
The Riders reported to the police officer on 
the day of the assault that defendant was 
angry because Gina had been talking to 
Tom Adams. It was for the jury to decide 
whether any credible inference could be 
drawn from that testimony that defendant 
wanted to stop Gina from involving herself 
with any official proceeding or investiga-
tion he believed was underway. The exist-
ence of contradictory evidence or conflict-
ing inferences does not warrant disturbing 
the jury's verdict State v. Howell, 649 
P.2d 91 (Utah 1982). 
II. 
Finally, defendant claims that he cannot 
be convicted of both aggravated assault 
and aggravated burglary, because under 
the facts of this case, the greater crime is 
that of aggravated assault which is the 
basis of the lesser crime of aggravated 
burglary. In support he cites State v. Hill, 
Utah, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (1983), where this 
Court stated that "where the two crimes 
are 'such that the greater cannot be com-
mitted without necessarily having commit-
ted the lesser,' State v. Baker, Utah, 671 
P.2d 152, 155 (1983), then as a matter of 
law they stand in the relationship of great-
er and lesser offenses, and the defendant 
cannot be convicted or punished for both." 
See also U.C-A. § 76-1-402(3) (1978 ed.). 
Aggravated assault is a felony of the 
third degree, whereas aggravated burglary 
is a felony of the first degree, and thus we 
need to determine whether defendant could 
have committed the aggravated burglary 
without necessarily having committed the 
aggravated assault1 
In State v. Hill, supra, we stated that a 
secondary test was required where the 
crimes standing in a greater-lesser relation-
ship have multiple variations. We must 
therefore consider the evidence to deter-
mine whether that relationship existed be-
tween the specific variations of the crimes 
actually proved at the defendant's trial. 
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[7] The elements of aggravated burgla-
ry proved at trial were that defendant (1) 
entered or remained unlawfully in the Rid-
ers' home (2) with the intent to commit an 
assault and that he (3) threatened immedi-
ate use of a deadly weapon. The elements 
of aggravated assault proved at trial were 
that defendant either (a) attempted with 
unlawful force or violence to do bodily inju-
ry to another; or (b) made a threat, accom-
panied by a show of immediate force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) carried out the attempt or threat by use 
of a deadly weapon. As can be seen, the 
elements of assault set out in (a) or (b) 
above are contained in (2) above (intent to 
commit assault), while the elements set out 
in (c), defining aggravated assault, are also 
contained in (3) above, defining aggravated 
burglary. Under the facts of this case, 
defendant should not have been convicted 
of aggravated assault as well as of aggra-
vated burglaiy. § 76-1-402(3). As we 
stated in State v. Hill, supra, when a de-
fendant has been improperly convicted of 
both the greater and the included offense, 
the conviction on the included offense is 
treated as mere surplusage and the convic-
tion of the greater offense remains unaf-
fected. 
The conviction of aggravated assault is 
reversed and the sentence thereon vacated. 
In all other respects, the judgment on the 
verdict is affirmed. 
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
We granted rehearing to consider the 
State's argument that the aggravated bur-
glary statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 
(1978), on its face does not require proof of 
the acts which make up the target offense 
of aggravated assault All that is required 
by that statute, according to the State, is 
proof that a defendant intended to commit 
the target offense. Consequently, contin-
ues its argument, aggravated assault re-
quires proof of more than all the facts 
required for proof of aggravated burglary, 
and defendant could have committed ag-
gravated burglary without necessarily hav-
ing committed aggravated assault We 
1. Defendant inadvertently reverses the order of the offenses. 
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have reviewed our decision on the reversal 
of defendant's conviction of aggravated as-
sault because it stood in the relationship of 
a lesser and included offense of aggravated 
burglary, of which he was also convicted. 
We have decided, under the narrow factual 
circumstances of this case, that the rever-
sal should stand, for the following reasons: 
[8] As a theoretical proposition, a de-
fendant could commit an aggravated bur-
glary without committing an aggravated 
assault Aggravated burglary may require 
no more than that the burglar be "armed 
with a deadly weapon." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-203(c). Being armed with a deadly 
weapon in and of itself would not amount 
to an assault However, aggravated bur-
glary may also be accomplished when the 
burglar "uses or threatens the immediate 
use of a dangerous or deadly weapon 
against any person who is not a participant 
in the crime." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-203(b). When that element is relied 
upon by the prosecution to prove aggrava-
ted burglary, aggravated assault is simul-
taneously proven. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103(lXb). 
[9] In the instant case, instructions giv-
en to the jury on aggravated burglary 
adopted the latter alternative, namely, that 
defendant "use[d] or threatened] the im-
mediate use of a dangerous or deadly 
weapon against any person." (This alter-
native was also employed in the charging 
information against defendant) Instruc-
tion No. 16 directed the jury to find all of 
the following elements before it could con-
vict defendant of aggravated burglary: (1) 
that defendant entered or remained in the 
building of Bill and Gina Rider; (2) that he 
did so unlawfully; (3) that he did so inten-
tionally, knowingly, or recklessly, (4) that 
he did so with the intent to commit a felo-
ny, a theft, or an assault on Bill Rider or 
Gina Rider; and (5) that in attempting, 
committing, or fleeing from said burglary, 
defendant or another participant in the 
crime used or threatened the immediate 
use of a dangerous or deadly weapon 
against the Riders. When that instruction 
is compared to instruction No. 13, which 
defined the elements of aggravated as-
sault, it is apparent that the jury did not 
have to find any additional elements for 
conviction of that crime beyond the ele-
ments of the crime of aggravated burglary. 
Instruction No. 13 on aggravated assault 
required the jury to find each and every 
one of the following elements: (1) that 
defendant assaulted Bill and Gina Rider; 
(2) that defendant then and there used a 
deadly weapon or such means or force like-
ly to produce death or serious bodily injury; 
and (3) that defendant did so intentionally 
or knowingly or recklessly. 
In this case, the State's evidence was 
that defendant with two companions en-
tered Rider's home at Rider's invitation. 
One of the companions ("Spider") pulled 
Rider's shotgun from a rack on the wall, 
drew a pistol from his waist, and pointed it 
at Rider's head. 
Since the jury was not required to find 
any additional elements to convict defend-
ant of aggravated assault once it had found 
him guilty of aggravated burglary, we cor-
rectly affirmed the conviction of aggrava-
ted burglary, a first degree felony, and 
vacated the conviction of aggravated as-
sault, a third degree felony, as being sur-
plusage. As we observed in our earlier 
opinion in this case, "where the two crimes 
are such that the greater cannot be com-
mitted without necessarily having commit-
ted the lesser, then as a matter of law they 
stand in the relationship of greater and 
lesser offenses, and the defendant cannot 
be convicted or punished for both." State 
v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). 
This result leaves defendant convicted of 
one first degree felony. As explained 
above, an information charging defendant 
with being armed with a deadly weapon 
under the count of aggravated burglary 
would have also subjected him to a convic-
tion of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony. Likewise, the State could have 
charged defendant with simple burglary, a 
second degree felony, which requires only 
an intent to commit an assault or felony, 
and with aggravated assault, a third de-
gree felony, which requires an actual as-
sault with a weapon. Under either of 
those scenarios, defendant 
been properly convicted of both offenses. 
Under the actual charges in this case, ag-
gravated assault constituted a lesser and 
included offense of aggravated burglary. 
Our decision thus stands. 
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would have 2. Criminal Law <s=>829(16) 
Court did not err in failing to give 
cautionary instruction regarding reliability 
of eyewitness identification, where defend-
ant was identified as robber by each of his 
victims, victims' testimony was corrobo-
rated by compelling direct and circumstan-
tial evidence of defendant's identity as rob-
ber, and court appropriately instructed jury 
on elements of offenses charged, prosecu-
tion's burden of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt, and role of jury in assessing credi-
bility of witnesses, which covered the same 
substance. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
• • 
Jerry Dee GRIFFITHS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
Nos. 860326, 860470. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 13, 1988. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. 
Conder, J., of aggravated robbery and ag-
gravated assault, and defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held that 
(1) court did not err in refusing to give 
requested cautionary instruction regarding 
reliability of eyewitness identification; (2) 
defendant waived right to relief for prose-
cutor's failure to disclose defendant's state-
ments made to arresting officer, (3) revers-
ible error was not committed by admitting 
testimony of witness which revealed exist-
ence of outstanding warrant for defend-
ant's arrest; and (4) testimony regarding 
significant change in defendant's appear-
ance did not constitute error. 
Affirmed. 
L Criminal Law s=>785(l) 
Decision whether to caution jury re-
garding reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion is matter within sound discretion of 
trial court 
3. Criminal Law <s»412(4) 
Defendant was not entitled to mistrial 
for State's failure to disclose to defendant 
until shortly before trial his statements 
made to arresting officer, where defendant 
did not move for continuance to which he 
would have been entitled; defendant 
waived right to relief by not making timely 
efforts to mitigate or eliminate prejudice 
caused by prosecutor's misconduct U.C.A. 
1953, 77-35-16(g). 
4. Criminal Law $=»1169.11 
Reversible error was not committed by 
admission of witness' testimony which re-
vealed existence of outstanding warrant 
for defendant's arrest in another unrelated 
matter, where witness' reference to war-
rant was very brief and only made in pass-
ing, testimony did not give details of cir-
cumstances which caused warrant to issue 
or of offense to which it was related, and 
court admonished jury to disregard testi-
mony. 
5. Criminal Law e=>374 
Court did not err in allowing witness to 
testify in robbery prosecution about signifi-
cant change in defendant's appearance be-
tween time she saw him in store and time 
he appeared for lineup despite defendant's 
contention that testimony would leave im-
pression that witness had been defendant's 
robbery victim in unrelated case, where 
court did not allow witness to describe cir-
cumstances of her encounter with defend-
ant, and only by conjecture could conclu-
sion be reached that witness had also been 
victim of defendant 
